Treaty would initiate the dichotomous relationship between Europe's anxiety over US withdrawal and its own ambition to achieve strategic autonomy. Thirdly, the 1954 European Defense
Community would set the inescapable precedent of preferred intergovernmentalism in matters of European defense. Section II will examine the two sets of tensions provoked by the treatiesintergovernmentalism versus supranationalism and Atlanticism versus Europeanism. Section III will offer contemporary circumstances to conclude how the tensions left by these legacies forestall consensus and encumber defense integration today.
Why Defense?
In 1943, two anti-fascist prisoners of war conceptualized a post-war plan for a federal
Europe that included a European armed service instead of national armies as an assurance against nationalism and war. 4 Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi's logic was that by transferring sovereign troops into a common military, Europe could create a de facto community where rivalry and war were no longer possible. European integration in the aftermath of World War II is often described as an effort to end the prolific conflicts that beset the continent, but Stephanie
Anderson reasons that while European integration was fundamentally about security, security integration was not necessarily inevitable. 5 It was not inevitable because of a dissonance between the removal of nationalism to end war and the preservation of national identities deeply ingrained in European countries. Henry Kissinger argues that the discord deals mostly with histories. He states, "…while powers may appear to outsiders as factors in a security arrangement, they appear domestically as expressions of historical existence. No power will submit to a settlement, however well-balanced and however "secure", which seems totally to deny its vision of itself." 6 Regarding this, the root of resistance is about national identity, and in preservation of such, also about sovereignty. The most imaginative effort to create a European army, the 1954 European Defense Community, provides an appropriate example since it was not mechanical problems but national pride and fear over lost sovereignty that caused it to fail. Its creator, Jean Monnet, admitted the idea of a European army was "at best premature". 7 But even with seventy years of participation that has pushed EU members away from national tendencies towards integration, why does defense integration remain so contested?
Ernest Haas sought to understand why EU members chose to integrate in some areas and not others. He theorized the process of European integration as an inevitable outcome of spillover, a motion of incremental participation in some areas that would lead to integration in others, much like a top-down invisible-hand pushing towards greater integration sector by sector. 8 Haas's observation of small steps evolving into larger goals is evident in the creation of many EU institutions, but if his notion of inevitability is correct, how is it that after circuitous growth and incremental collaboration, the EU is still unable to push towards a common defense?
Incrementalism is often critiqued as too linear a process because European integration is a result of mixed impulses in which participation can be quickly abandoned or reversed when it no longer serves the interests of involved parties. 9 Andrew Moravcsik interprets each critical phase in EU integration as intrinsically responsive to the decisions of national governments who bargain with each other on a case-by-case basis, not because they succumbed to a self-reinforcing process built upon fidelity to prior commitments. 10 Nowhere is this more apparent than in the legacy of Europe's defense and security cooperation. EU member states lack a unanimous vision for
European security because they prefer to cooperate when necessary but jealously guard their sovereign authority to make decisions concerning their national troops. Because of this, the apparatuses, but when it comes to defense, some European states are readier to integrate than others. The root of the disagreement is the degree of compromise between strengthening the efficacy of EU institutions and maintaining sovereignty. That the EDC was both proposed and rejected by France is an especially interesting example of the parallelism of the scenario where creative contributions to new governing models war with concessions that appear to jeopardize certain ideas of survival. Interestingly, Great Britain and France would at times have overlapping, albeit nuanced, outlooks on intergovernmentalism and defense, but they would never reach consensus on the long-term vision of who should be involved in the process.
Atlanticism and Europeanism
The second prevailing tension is about who should be involved in European security. This is ultimately about the United States and a contest between conflicting geopolitical ideologies.
The two original signers of the Dunkirk Treaty would ultimately part ways on this regard, each vigorously representing different camps over the future of Europe's security. Great Britain would be a champion of the controversial Atlanticism, and France would ceaselessly promote the idealistic Europeanism.
Atlanticism is the belief that the transatlantic partnership between the United States and
Europe is a special relationship where close economic, political, and defense cooperation allows them to mutually prosper. Atlanticists are committed advocates of defense coordination with the US and seek to reinforce European military cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). They see an independent European military as a challenge to that relationship and an unnecessary duplication of resources, especially since most EU members already belong to NATO. In the aftermath of the Dunkirk Treaty and after a few precarious moments in the 1960s, Great Britain would become the biggest supporter of the transatlantic relationship, in part due to its instrumental role in securing American involvement after WWII.
The Anglo-American relationship created resentment among European states who already struggled with the British involvement in the European project. However, US involvement in
European security emerged as a multifaceted dilemma, because the structure of the transatlantic partnership is almost irrevocably necessary for European safety from a practical lens, but such a reality challenges the European identity.
Europeanists believe that as long as the US is on hand to ensure European security and with it, US influence, there will be a clear limit to the ambition of the European project. 49 As the history above demonstrates, US participation was necessary for protection in the post-war the bipolarity of the Americans and the Soviets in which Europe aspired to offer an alternative option. Unable to balance against the US in the post-WWII climate and in order to guarantee security against the soviets, a transatlantic relationship was the most viable option for Europe.
Because of this, the American security umbrella allowed "peace to reign in Western Europe" which contributed to Europe experimenting in new political and economic initiatives. 52 The first half of the twentieth-century cast a dark shroud on Europe, and the architectures of the European project sought Europe's restoration by virtue of its illustrious past to thereafter project a devotion to liberalism and peace. 53 This refurbished imaged and the new initiatives allowed Europe to develop remarkable economic status and abundant soft power appeal. And while
Europe has done well exporting that image, Europeanists also see their soft power as not enough if they are to compete with other superpowers; they wish to see themselves as a civilian power with teeth.
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Europeanism however, depends upon engineering a consciousness of shared political destiny and a common future. Why Europeanism and Atlanticism war with one another is that an aid in establishing solidarity among the many diverse European nations was then and remains today the collective recognition that they are not American. America plays the role of the constitutive "other" in order for Europeans to agree on a shared identity consistent with the goals 
SECTION: III Contemporary Relevance
Using the history of the early defense treaties, I have outlined three outcomes from whence the lack of consensus emerged. Firstly, the Dunkirk Treaty sewed Great Britain to the European continent by giving it a say in European security matters and ultimately introduced Atlanticism. Second, the Brussels Treaty initiated the dichotomous and seemingly irreparable relationship between Europe's long-standing anxiety over US withdrawal and its own ambition to achieve strategic autonomy. Thirdly, the European Defense Community set the precedent of preferred intergovernmentalism when it comes to defense integration. Taken holistically, all three intermingle to create the quagmire of European defense integration today. This concluding section will look at three contemporary circumstances jointly in order to amplify the conflicting tensions created by these early treaties.
United Kingdom Referendum
In June 2016, the United Kingdom decided to leave the European Union. 64 A median of 68 percent of NATO member countries surveyed believe that the US would uphold its commitment, more so than they themselves would be willing to do. 65 More importantly, Eurobarometer reports in 2017 that of EU member states, 39% are "somewhat in favor" and only 16% are "totally in favor" of the creation of an EU army. 66 The lack of public support in this department is significant because EU governments are generally unwilling to invest in their own defenses, much less in the equipment it would take for the EU to achieve strategic autonomy from NATO. 68 In semblance to this, the lack of consensus regarding defense integration can be seen both as a crisis of capacity and a crisis of confidence. Not surprisingly, the political ramifications sustain the dilemma. This discussion bleeds inextricably into the discord between the institutional models and their response to the ostensible rise of nationalist politics within the European Union.
Rise in Nationalism

Donald
Tusk's open letter was also provoked by renewed nationalistic discourse as a response to the public dissatisfaction with EU institutions. He sought to warn European leaders that, …it must be made crystal clear that the disintegration of the European Union will not lead to the restoration of some mythical, full sovereignty of its member states, but to their real and factual dependence on the great superpowers…only together can we be fully independent.
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The inescapable conflict is that the independence Tusk seeks is the same type of independence EU member states invoke to maintain autonomy from advanced EU integration. Tusk is speaking 68 Anderson, "Crafting US 71 The underlying evidence from then and now, is that when it comes to defense, member states prefer to cooperate case-by-case and not to integrate beyond their ability to maintain agency. The European Defense Community set the precedent of preferred intergovernmentalism, so much so to the point that in a public letter, eleven former generals and admirals counseled EU leaders against the scheme of a supranational army warning, "technocrats playing at arm chair generals, building a fictitious paper army, will only serve to weaken even further our national capabilities…they should beware: paper tigers burn." 72 A supranational model may remove the incoordination of asymmetrical capacities and diverging policy interests, and may also be seen as a "coming of age" in the integration process, but it is ultimately lacks supports.
Conclusion
After announcing Europe's protection can no longer be outsourced, European Europe…Depending on how one looked at human nature, this state of affairs could be seen either as a triumph of wisdom over blind violence, or as evidence of utter exhaustion." 75 Yet, wisdom is ephemeral and exhaustion unproven to evaporate the preservation of identity. Only by vanquishing the spectre of nationalism could the European Union transcend the quixotic legacy of these three early treaties and achieve European defense integration.
